Defensive emotions and evaluative judgements: Sensitivity to anger and fear predicts moral judgements, whereas sensitivity to disgust predicts aesthetic judgements.

Aesthetic and moral evaluations engage appetitive and defensive emotions. While the role played by pleasure in positive aesthetic and moral judgements has been extensively researched, little is known about how defensive emotions influence negative aesthetic and moral judgements. Specifically, it is unknown which defensive emotions such judgements tap into, and whether both kinds of judgement share a common emotional root. Here, we investigated how participants' individual sensitivity to disgust, fear, anger and sadness predicted subjective judgements of aesthetic and moral stimuli. Bayesian modelling revealed that participants who were more sensitive to anger and fear found conventional and moral transgressions more wrong. In contrast, participants who were more sensitive to disgust disliked asymmetrical geometric patterns and untidy rooms more. These findings suggest that aesthetic and moral evaluations engage multiple defensive emotions, not just disgust, and that they may rely on different defensive emotions as part of their computational mechanism.

How universal is preference for visual curvature? A systematic review and meta-analysis.

Evidence dating back a century shows that humans are sensitive to and exhibit a preference for visual curvature. This effect has been observed in different age groups, human cultures, and primate species, suggesting that a preference for curvature could be universal. At the same time, several studies have found that preference for curvature is modulated by contextual and individual factors, casting doubt on this hypothesis. To resolve these conflicting findings, we conducted a systematic meta-analysis of studies that have investigated the preference for visual curvature. Our meta-analysis included 61 studies which provided 106 independent samples and 309 effect sizes. The results of a three-level random effects model revealed a Hedges' g of 0.39-consistent with a medium effect size. Further analyses revealed that preference for curvature is moderated by four factors: presentation time, stimulus type, expertise, and task. Together, our results suggest that preference for visual curvature is a reliable but not universal phenomenon and is influenced by factors other than perceptual information.

Differences in regional gray matter volume predict the extent to which openness influences judgments of beauty and pleasantness of interior architectural spaces.

Hedonic evaluation of sensory objects varies from person to person. While this variability has been linked to differences in experience, little is known about why stimuli lead to different evaluations in different people. We used linear mixed-effects models to determine the extent to which the openness, contour, and ceiling height of interior spaces influenced the beauty and pleasantness ratings of 18 participants. Then, by analyzing structural brain images acquired for the same group of participants, we asked if any regional gray matter volume (rGMV) covaried with these differences in the extent to which the three features influence beauty and pleasantness ratings. Voxel-based morphometry analysis revealed that the influence of openness on pleasantness ratings correlated with rGMV in the anterior prefrontal cortex (Brodmann area (BA)-10), and the influence of openness on beauty ratings correlated with rGMV in the temporal pole (BA38) and cluster, including the posterior cingulate cortex (BA31) and paracentral lobule (BA5/6). There were no significant correlations involving contour or ceiling height. Our results suggest that regional variance in gray matter volume may play a role in the computation of hedonic valuation and account for differences in the way people weigh certain attributes of interior architectural spaces.

Emotional representations of space vary as a function of peoples' affect and interoceptive sensibility.

Most research on people's representation of space has focused on spatial appraisal and navigation. But there is more to space besides navigation and assessment: people have different emotional experiences at different places, which create emotionally tinged representations of space. Little is known about the emotional representation of space and the factors that shape it. The purpose of this study was to develop a graphic methodology to study the emotional representation of space and some of the environmental features (non-natural vs. natural) and personal features (affective state and interoceptive sensibility) that modulate it. We gave participants blank maps of the region where they lived and asked them to apply shade where they had happy/sad memories, and where they wanted to go after Covid-19 lockdown. Participants also completed self-reports on affective state and interoceptive sensibility. By adapting methods for analyzing neuroimaging data, we examined shaded pixels to quantify where and how strong emotions are represented in space. The results revealed that happy memories were consistently associated with similar spatial locations. Yet, this mapping response varied as a function of participants' affective state and interoceptive sensibility. Certain regions were associated with happier memories in participants whose affective state was more positive and interoceptive sensibility was higher. The maps of happy memories, desired locations to visit after lockdown, and regions where participants recalled happier memories as a function of positive affect and interoceptive sensibility overlayed significantly with natural environments. These results suggest that people's emotional representations of their environment are shaped by the naturalness of places, and by their affective state and interoceptive sensibility.

The role of working memory capacity in evaluative judgments of liking and beauty.

Judgments of liking and beauty appear to be expressions of a common hedonic state, but they differ in how they engage cognitive processes. We hypothesised that beauty judgments place greater demands on limited executive resources than judgments of liking. We tested this hypothesis by asking two groups of participants to judge works of visual art for their beauty or liking while having to remember the location of 1, 3, or 5 dots in a 4 by 4 matrix. We also examined the effect of individual differences in working memory capacity. Our results show that holding information about the location of the dots in working memory delayed judgments of beauty but not of liking. Also, the greater participants' working memory capacity, the faster they completed the working memory task when judging liking, but not when judging beauty. Our study provides evidence that judging beauty draws more on working memory resources than judging liking.

Evaluative judgment across domains: Liking balance, contour, symmetry and complexity in melodies and visual designs.

Evaluative judgment-i.e., assessing to what degree a stimulus is liked or disliked-is a fundamental aspect of cognition, facilitating comparison and choosing among alternatives, deciding, and prioritizing actions. Neuroimaging studies have shown that evaluative judgment involves the projection of sensory information to the reward circuit. To investigate whether evaluative judgments are based on modality-specific or modality-general attributes, we compared the extent to which balance, contour, symmetry, and complexity affect liking responses in the auditory and visual modalities. We found no significant correlation for any of the four attributes across sensory modalities, except for contour. This suggests that evaluative judgments primarily rely on modality-specific sensory representations elaborated in the brain's sensory cortices and relayed to the reward circuit, rather than abstract modality-general representations. The individual traits art experience, openness to experience, and desire for aesthetics were associated with the extent to which design or compositional attributes influenced liking, but inconsistently across sensory modalities and attributes, also suggesting modality-specific influences.

The nature of beauty: behavior, cognition, and neurobiology.

Beauty is commonly used to refer to positive evaluative appraisals that are uniquely human. Little is known, however, about what distinguishes beauty in terms of psychological function or neurobiological mechanisms. Our review describes recent empirical studies and synthesizes what behavioral, cognitive, and neuroscientific experiments have revealed about the nature of beauty. These findings suggest that beauty shares computational mechanisms with other forms of hedonic appraisal of sensory objects but is distinguished by specific conceptual expectations. Specifically, experiencing an object as pleasurable is a prerequisite for judging it to be beautiful; but to qualify as beautiful, an object must elicit especially high levels of pleasure and be matched to internal learned models of what counts as beautiful. We discuss how these empirical findings contradict several assumptions about beauty, including the notion that beauty is disinterested, and that it is specific to Homo sapiens.

There are no aesthetic emotions: Comment on Menninghaus et al. (2019).

Menninghaus and colleagues (2019) have recently argued that aesthetic emotions constitute a distinct class of emotions. They claim that aesthetic emotions are distinct because they involve an aesthetic evaluation, they are tuned to specific aesthetic virtues, they involve subjectively felt pleasure or displeasure, and predict liking or disliking. Here we examine the theory in the light of psychological and neurobiological empirical findings. We show that Menninghaus and colleagues failed to provide evidence that aesthetic emotions are different than other kinds of emotions in terms of psychological components or neurobiological underpinnings. We present empirical evidence that strongly suggests that affective states observed during aesthetic appreciation events are not distinctly different from affective states observed during other forms of sensory valuation. We conclude that it may be time to retire the idea that aesthetic emotions constitute a special class of human emotions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

A Set of 200 Musical Stimuli Varying in Balance, Contour, Symmetry, and Complexity: Behavioral and Computational Assessments.

We present a novel set of 200 Western tonal musical stimuli (MUST) to be used in research on perception and appreciation of music. It consists of four subsets of 50 stimuli varying in balance, contour, symmetry, or complexity. All are 4 s long and designed to be musically appealing and experimentally controlled. We assessed them behaviorally and computationally. The behavioral assessment (Study 1) aimed to determine whether musically untrained participants could identify variations in each attribute. Forty-three participants rated the stimuli in each subset on the corresponding attribute. We found that inter-rater reliability was high and that the ratings mirrored the design features well. Participants' ratings also served to create an abridged set of 24 stimuli per subset. The computational assessment (Study 2) required the development of a specific battery of computational measures describing the structural properties of each stimulus. We distilled nonredundant composite measures for each attribute and examined whether they predicted participants' ratings. Our results show that the composite measures indeed predicted participants' ratings. Moreover, the composite complexity measure predicted complexity ratings as well as existing models of musical complexity. We conclude that the four subsets are suitable for use in studies that require presenting participants with short musical motifs varying in balance, contour, symmetry, or complexity, and that the stimuli and the computational measures are valuable resources for research in music psychology, empirical aesthetics, music information retrieval, and musicology. The MUST set and MATLAB toolbox codifying the computational measures are freely available at osf.io/bfxz7.

Psychological and neural responses to architectural interiors.

People spend considerable time within built environments. In this study, we tested two hypotheses about the relationship between people and built environments. First, aesthetic responses to architectural interiors reduce to a few key psychological dimensions that are sensitive to design features. Second, these psychological dimensions evoke specific neural signatures. In Experiment 1, participants (n = 798) rated 200 images of architectural interiors on 16 aesthetic response measures. Using Psychometric Network Analysis (PNA) and Principal Components Analysis (PCA), we identified three components that explained 90% of the variance in ratings: coherence (ease with which one organizes and comprehends a scene), fascination (a scene's informational richness and generated interest), and hominess (extent to which a scene reflects a personal space). Whereas coherence and fascination are well-established dimensions in response to natural scenes and visual art, hominess emerged as a new dimension related to architectural interiors. In Experiment 2 (n = 614), the PCA results were replicated in an independent sample, indicating the robustness of these three dimensions. In Experiment 3, we reanalyzed data from an fMRI study in which participants (n = 18) made beauty judgments and approach-avoidance decisions when viewing the same images. Parametric analyses demonstrated that, regardless of task, the degree of fascination covaried with neural activity in the right lingual gyrus. In contrast, coherence covaried with neural activity in the left inferior occipital gyrus only when participants judged beauty, whereas hominess covaried with neural activity in the left cuneus only when they made approach-avoidance decisions. Importantly, this neural activation did not covary in relation to global image properties including self-similarity and complexity scores. These results suggest that the visual brain harbors sensitivities to psychological dimensions of coherence, fascination, and hominess in the context of architectural interiors. Furthermore, valuation of architectural processing in visual cortices varies by dimension and task.

Reply to Myszkowski et al. (2020): Some matters of fact concerning aesthetic sensitivity.

We respond to some of Myszkowski and colleagues' (2020, Br. J. Psychology) critical comments on our recent work on aesthetic sensitivity (Corradi, Chuquichambi, Barrada, Clemente, & Nadal, 2020, Br. J. Psychology). We show that these comments stem mostly from factual inaccuracies.

A Farewell to Art: Aesthetics as a Topic in Psychology and Neuroscience.

Empirical aesthetics and neuroaesthetics study two main issues: the valuation of sensory objects and art experience. These two issues are often treated as if they were intrinsically interrelated: Research on art experience focuses on how art elicits aesthetic pleasure, and research on valuation focuses on special categories of objects or emotional processes that determine the aesthetic experience. This entanglement hampers progress in empirical aesthetics and neuroaesthetics and limits their relevance to other domains of psychology and neuroscience. Substantial progress in these fields is possible only if research on aesthetics is disentangled from research on art. We define aesthetics as the study of how and why sensory stimuli acquire hedonic value. Under this definition, aesthetics becomes a fundamental topic for psychology and neuroscience because it links hedonics (the study of what hedonic valuation is in itself) and neuroeconomics (the study of how hedonic values are integrated into decision making and behavioral control). We also propose that this definition of aesthetics leads to concrete empirical questions, such as how perceptual information comes to engage value signals in the reward circuit or why different psychological and neurobiological factors elicit different appreciation events for identical sensory objects.

A new conception of visual aesthetic sensitivity.

Aesthetic sensitivity has been defined as the ability to recognize and appreciate beauty and compositional excellence, and to judge artistic merit according to standards of aesthetic value. The Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity Test (VAST) has often been used to assess this ability, but recent research has revealed it has several psychometric problems. Such problems are not easily remedied, because they reflect flawed assumptions inherent to the concept of aesthetic sensitivity as traditionally understood, and to the VAST itself. We introduce a new conception of aesthetic sensitivity defined as the extent to which someone's aesthetic valuation is influenced by a given feature. Experiment 1 aimed to characterize aesthetic sensitivity to four prominent features in visual aesthetics: complexity, symmetry, contour, and balance. Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and to assess the test-retest reliability of an instrument designed to measure aesthetic sensitivity to these features using an abridged set of stimuli. Our results reveal that people differ remarkably in the extent to which visual features influence their liking, highlighting the crucial role of individual variation when modelling aesthetic preferences. We did not find clear relations between the four measures of aesthetic sensitivity and personality, intelligence, and art interest and knowledge. Finally, our measurement instrument exhibited an adequate-to-good test-retest reliability.

Medial prefrontal cortex involvement in aesthetic appreciation of paintings: a tDCS study.

Among the brain regions involved in the aesthetic evaluation of paintings, the prefrontal cortex seems to play a pivotal role. In particular, consistent neuroimaging evidence indicates that activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (mainly in the left hemisphere) and in medial and orbital sectors of the prefrontal cortex is linked to viewing aesthetically pleasing images. In this study, we focused on the contribution of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in mediating aesthetic decisions about paintings. We found that enhancing excitability in this region via anodal tDCS led participants to judge paintings as more beautiful. Although significant, the effects were moderate, possibly due to the neutral affective value of the artworks we used, suggesting that activity in mPFC may be critically dependent on the affective impact of the paintings.

Aesthetic sensitivity to curvature in real objects and abstract designs.

The features of objects have a strong influence on how we evaluate, judge, approach, and behave toward them. People generally prefer complex, symmetric, balanced and curved designs. In addition to these general trends, however, there are substantial differences among people in what they like and prefer, and in the extent to which their preferences and choices are modulated by design features. Here we aimed to determine whether curvature in real objects and abstract designs influenced participants' preference to the same extent. We found that, in general, participants prefer real objects and abstract designs with curved contours. But we also uncovered a remarkable breadth of variation in individual preferences. Finally, our results show that people who are highly sensitive to curvature in real objects are also highly sensitive to curvature in abstract designs, and that people who are insensitive to curvature in one kind of stimulus are also insensitive to the other.

Neuroaesthetics and art's diversity and universality.

There is a duality to art. It is enormously varied and culturally diverse, and yet it is also universal, common to all humans. Art's variability and distinctiveness seem to elude science, better equipped to account for constant or regular phenomena. We believe that art's cultural particularity can be reconciled with its biological universality. The emergence of variability and distinctiveness from common mechanisms is at the core of biological explanation; it is a basic fact of life, and a basic fact of brain function. The individual, cultural, and historical diversity of art, both in its production and its appreciation, owe to basic features of the organization and function of the human brain. Each encounter with an artwork engages flexible neural networks that are modulated by context, expectations, emotional states, goals, and experience. Because these factors change from one occasion to another, each encounter with art has its distinct flavor. Repeated encounters with art over the course of a lifetime lead people develop personal preferences for art, as the network connections become strengthened in unique ways. These flexible and adaptable networks evolved in humans as a consequence of the relaxation of genetic constraints on the development of brain regions involved in orchestrating network dynamics, enabling a greater impact of learning and experience. In sum, art is universal and common because it arises from neural systems that are common to all humans, and it is variable and diverse because those neural systems evolved to be flexible, attuned to momentary contexts and goals, and changing through a lifetime of experiences. This article is categorized under: Economics > Individual Decision-Making Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Neuroscience > Cognition.

Cross-cultural empirical aesthetics.

Cross-cultural empirical aesthetics seeks to determine whether the psychological processes underlying aesthetic preference are universal. Here we provide a critical review of the field's origin, development, and current state. Our goal is to evaluate the evidence and separate what is actually known from what is only assumed. We conclude that the evidence shows that people from different cultures base their aesthetic preference on a common set of formal features, including symmetry, complexity, proportion, contour, brightness, and contrast. The reason for this commonality is that aesthetic preference emerges from basic perceptual and valuation processes that are common to all humans, and to many other animals.

Art is not special: an assault on the last lines of defense against the naturalization of the human mind.

The assumption that human cognition requires exceptional explanations holds strong in some domains of behavioral and brain sciences. Scientific aesthetics in general, and neuroaesthetics in particular, abound with claims for art-specific cognitive or neural processes. This assumption fosters a conceptual structure disconnected from other fields and biases the sort of processes to be studied. More generally, assuming that art is special is to cling to the idea that some aspect of our species' mental constitution makes us unique, special, and meaningful. This assumption continues to relegate scientific aesthetics to the periphery of science and hampers a naturalized view of the human mind.